Safety, Language and Perspective and Why They matter in Aviation

I recently read a post in which the author focused on whether it’s legal, or appropriate, for EASA category C licence holders to sign releases for return to service for aircraft on which they performed work on under a B1 or B2 designation.

The article touched on some very valid points, however for a couple of reasons it struck a chord with me that I felt was important enough that I had to mention.

Firstly, as with what seems to happen so much in today’s world, the author drew conclusions and made statements using language like “… leads to decreased safety…” or “… causes…”  without providing evidence, referencing substantiating data or even giving examples.

This to me is unfortunate; as I for one take everything in the public realm with a grain of salt these days. It seems that all too many people today state opinions or repeat something that they’ve heard as fact; and what’s even more concerning is that nobody seems to do their own fact checking or verification.

Discernment seems to be almost completely lost.

Now, if the language used in the article was more objective, I wouldn’t struggle so much with it.

Saying “… it may lead to decreased safety …” or “… it could lead to decreased safety …” may be a subtle difference, but it’s distinctly different than “… leads to decreased safety…”.

It’s important to understand how the language we use may be interpreted. As a trained Airworthiness Inspector, I’ve learned to glean different things from what’s written; often simply by how it’s written. For instance, interchanging the words may, might, will, shall, could, should, would or even omitting one of these can give the same sentence a seemingly insignificant but vastly different meaning; as it did in the author’s article.

Secondly, the article considered only one perspective.

This is one of the exact reasons Annalisa and I started our podcast “Aviation Perspectives with C.A.C.”.

Understandably, it’s difficult, if not impossible, to consider every perspective, and it’s almost impossible to declare that one is right over another.

However, only presenting one perspective keeps us in the dark about other possibilities that might exist.

The writer’s statements regarding falling foul of EASA’s intentions may be entirely founded; although he did state that EASA regulation does not explicitly prohibit the practice; which is another whole conversation in itself.

It’s only when we examine what drives the process does it become possible to draw informed conclusions. Listening to others’ perspectives often helps us better understand intent; and that there is always more than one way of meeting this intent.

As an Airworthiness Inspector working under different aviation regulatory regimes, and overseeing vast numbers and types of different organizations, I can tell you that there are so so many different ways of arriving at the same intended outcomes.

In this instance the intended consequence is a safe aviation environment. It’s expected that we all arrive there by adopting and abiding by the ICAO SARPs.

This is one area where different perspectives definitely come into play; as every State’s regulatory regime reflects how they feel they can best meet the SARPs; given their structures and available resources.

All this to say that even if EASA explicitly prohibited a C category AME from releasing an aircraft that he or she had performed work on under his or her B1 or B2 licence, that doesn’t necessarily guarantee a safe condition.

In fact, I can offer practical examples where different organizations employed systems like those required by EASA but abandoned them for safety reasons; as their respective regulations permitted.

I’ve witnessed firsthand where some organizations claimed, and proved statistically, that they encountered fewer quality escapes by having the same individuals that performed the work release the respective aircraft for service. This was attributed to simple accountability.

It was posited that when different Inspection levels were involved prior to release, the individual performing the actual work was more inclined to overlook issues; as they relied more heavily on someone else down the line to catch them.

By holding the person performing the work directly accountable for its release, quality escapes were proven to diminish, thereby actually increasing safety. This couldn’t be refuted.

As an example, I once worked at a large MRO where we had independent Inspectors that would buy-back a mechanic’s work after it was accomplished. The mechanic would accomplish the work set out in the assigned task card, and the Inspector would look at what was accomplished and then give the “ok to close”. Another task card would be issued to close the access panel that had been opened. I received the card to close, but before doing so I used my mirror and flashlight to once again look around and do my own ok to close inspection. Unfortunately, I didn’t have to look very far before I found a large area of exfoliation on a front spar; that had been overlooked by both the mechanic performing work in the area and the Inspector who verified the accomplishment of that work. The aircraft certainly was not safe, and it was grounded for a few more weeks.

In conclusion, all the above isn’t intended to support or disprove either perspective but is offered only as a reminder that there is always another perspective; and that there is rarely a one-size fits all solution.

To draw uninformed conclusions is where the real threat to safety lies.

Bret - Aircraft Management Specialist, Airworthiness Safety Inspector, Co-Author of "Introduction to Aircraft Management"